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Malpractice Suits and Physician Apologies in Cancer Care
By Eugene Chung, MD, PhD, JD, Jill R. Horwitz, MPP, JD, PhD, John A. E. Pottow, JD,
and Reshma Jagsi, MD, DPhil
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI
Consider the following case:
The patient is a 44-year-old woman who presents for radia-
tion treatment of an isolated locoregional recurrence of breast
cancer in her chest wall, 3 years after undergoing mastectomy.
At the time of diagnosis, she had T2N2M0 disease, with four of
15 lymph nodes involved with tumor. She received a mastec-
tomy with negative margins and appropriate chemotherapy,
but none of her physicians talked to her about postmastectomy
radiation therapy, which would clearly have been indicated to
reduce her risk of locoregional failure and would have been
expected to improve her likelihood of survival. She asks the
radiation oncologist who sees her whether this recurrence could
have been prevented, and she notes that when she was diag-
nosed with the recurrence, a nurse asked her why she had not
received radiation before. She states that she is thinking of re-
taining an attorney. The radiation oncologist says, “Dwelling
on what could have been done isn’t productive—let’s just focus
on how we can fight this cancer now.”
This case reveals some of the dilemmas oncologists face
when treating patients who have suffered from substandard
medical care. It also highlights some of the shortcomings of the
existing tort system, both in addressing the legitimate claims of
the patient who has been harmed by negligent care and in
promoting quality improvement. In this article, we survey the
US medical malpractice system and assess the effectiveness of
tort law at achieving its goals. We then consider how physicians
and health care organizations could better assist negligently
harmed patients and simultaneously reduce future mistakes.
Specifically, we describe how the hypothetical case presented
might have been handled if it had occurred at our own institu-
tion, which has adopted a novel approach to promote transpar-
ency and remedy through disclosure and apology by negligent
providers to injured patients. This program was designed to
compensate patients swiftly and fairly when there is evidence of
harm caused by unreasonable care, as well as to decrease future
errors through continuous quality improvement and an open
exchange with injured patients about medical mistakes.
In this article, we use the term “negligent” specifically to
denote the legal standard of care for medical malpractice liabil-
ity. Although the precise contours vary by state, negligent typ-
ically refers to a level of treatment below that which would be
provided by physicians with “the knowledge, skill and care or-
dinarily possessed and employed by members of the profession
in good standing,” under the circumstances.1(p187) We use the
term “unreasonable” when discussing the Michigan program
because that is the relevant threshold established by the pro-
gram. These need not be synonyms, nor need they be exclusive
or even exhaustive categories of medical error. For example,
iatrogenic injuries may result for reasons unrelated to negligent
or unreasonable treatment; it may be that a course of treatment
comes to be seen as the wrong course ex post when the decision
to follow the course was appropriate and reasonable ex ante.
Some might consider these reasonable decisions as not errors at
all. Others might consider them errors in a broader, abstract
sense, but only classify them as unfortunate or regrettable, not
negligent or unreasonable. We use the term “substandard”
more generally to denote care that fails to meet a certain thresh-
old or standard.
The Tort-Based Medical Malpractice System in the
United States
In the United States, situations like the example case are typi-
cally administered by the tort-based system of medical malprac-
tice, which requires negligent defendants to redress their
wrongful conduct by paying financial compensation to success-
ful plaintiffs. In addition to corrective justice, the most fre-
quently articulated goals of this system are compensating for
negligently caused harms (including payments for medical bills,
lost wages, reduced future employment, and pain and suffering)
and deterring poor medical treatment.
The tort-based, malpractice system, however, does not al-
ways function as intended. There have been three “malpractice
crises” over the past 30 years, and considerable evidence dem-
onstrates that the system often fails to achieve its goals.2 Al-
though many patients are injured by substandard medical care
each year, only a small percentage of them are compensated
through the tort system. The Harvard Medical Practice Study I
reviewed the records of 30,121 patients treated in New York
State in 1984 to determine the incidence of adverse events.3
They demonstrated that adverse events occurred in 3.7% of
hospitalizations, and of these adverse events, 27.6% were due to
negligence. Extrapolating these data, they estimated that
27,179 adverse events in New York State in 1984 were the
result of negligence. Furthermore, they found that the more
serious the adverse event, the more frequently negligence oc-
curred, with 51.3% of adverse-event deaths caused by negli-
gence. A more recent study by the Congressional Budget Office
estimates that in 2003, 181,000 severe medical injuries in US
hospitals were the result of negligence.4
Although the absolute numbers of adverse events caused by
medical negligence are high, few patients file legal claims. The
Harvard Medical Practice Study III examined the relationship
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between malpractice claims and adverse events caused by neg-
ligence in New York in 1984. It found that claims occurred only
13% as often as injuries resulting from malpractice. Moreover,
only 1.5% of adverse events caused by negligence led to claims.5
Numerous explanations are possible for the low number of
medical malpractice claims in the setting of so many cases of
injuries related to negligence. Patients may view many injuries
as minor or may have adequate disability or health insurance
benefits to cover the costs of their injuries. They may not wish
to jeopardize relationships with their caregivers by suing, they
may have difficulty securing legal representation, or they may
not trust lawyers. Injured patients may also be unaware that
they received substandard medical care, particularly in areas as
complex as cancer care. With the practice of medicine becom-
ing increasingly specialized, few patients can be expected to
know when a medical decision has injured them unless a med-
ical professional informs them. Despite state law and accredita-
tion body rules that require providers to report serious adverse
events,6 there is considerable evidence that providers frequently
fail to disclose their own errors.7-10
In the hypothetical case above, only a nurse’s incidental
comment alerted the patient to a problem with prior care. Fur-
thermore, despite not participating in the substandard treat-
ment, the consulting physician was reluctant to discuss it.
Physicians often feel uncomfortable assigning blame to other
physicians, perhaps out of a sense of collegiality or a desire to
preserve referral networks. Moreover, many physicians object
to the malpractice system in general or dislike admitting their
own errors or calling attention to those of others. Some may fear
that exposing errors will trigger malpractice claims that will
compromise their own ability to practice or maintain malprac-
tice insurance coverage. Furthermore, in many cases, other care-
givers may not have access to enough details about a situation to
comment responsibly about whether an error occurred. Thus,
many patients may not file viable claims because they never
discover they have cause to do so.
Whatever the reason, few patients pursue medical malprac-
tice claims, and an even smaller number of claims proceed to a
final judgment. The vast majority are settled before trial. Only
approximately 30% of filed claims go to trial, 7% of which are
decided by juries, with plaintiffs (the injured party) prevailing
in 27% of these jury trials.11,12 Even when there is strong evi-
dence of medical negligence, as determined by independent
physician reviewers, plaintiffs are successful in only about half
of the cases that go to trial.13,14
One of the difficulties in winning a medical malpractice
case is proving causation, that is, proving that the physician’s
negligence rather than chance resulted in an injury. In the
hypothetical case above, the chance of a local recurrence after
postmastectomy radiotherapy might still be as high as 10%, as
compared with 30% without radiotherapy.15,16 Trying to de-
termine whether the failure to refer for radiation caused the
local recurrence or whether the local recurrence would have
occurred even with proper treatment is quite difficult. Although
some jurisdictions allow suits for “loss of chance”—a doctrine
that permits malpractice suits on behalf of patients who were
deprived a significant probability of survival and died as a re-
sult—this doctrine has not been adopted uniformly.17 In Mich-
igan, for example, the law states that “in an action alleging
malpractice, the plaintiff cannot recover for loss of an opportu-
nity to survive or an opportunity to achieve a better result unless
the opportunity was greater than 50%.”18 Because acts or omis-
sions may cumulatively increase or decrease the risk of recur-
rence and death for patients with cancer, applying the doctrine
to any one particular act or omission can be particularly diffi-
cult.
Thus, although one of the main goals of the tort system is to
compensate injured patients, the data suggest that many injured
patients may not be compensated in the current medical mal-
practice system. In addition, even when patients successfully
win medical malpractice lawsuits, variability in jury awards and
tort reform measures such as damage caps have economically
significant effects on payments to successful plaintiffs.19 Al-
though there is a positive relationship between “independent
assessments of liability and of injury cost and outcomes of legal
disputes alleging malpractice,”20(p17) the best evidence suggests
that the system is inefficient at compensating patients.3
In addition to compensation, the malpractice system is
meant to improve quality by deterring negligent care. Accord-
ingly, the threat of costly litigation as well as having to report to
the National Practitioners Data Bank offers health care provid-
ers the necessary incentives to take the appropriate level of safety
precautions. Unfortunately, there is little evidence that this pro-
cess works well either.
The deterrence theory for medical liability assumes that pro-
viders know the law, behave in an economically rational man-
ner by weighing the costs and benefits of their actions, and
internalize the costs of their choices.11 Yet these assumptions are
often unfounded. For example, physicians who carry liability
insurance are largely shielded from the financial burden of their
own negligent acts.21 They are protected because, although
physicians found liable for malpractice may be dropped from
their insurance carriers, premiums are not typically based on
individual physician liability experience but are set according to
the location and specialty of the physician.21
Moreover, the incentives do not always work as intended.
Although the tort system attempts to encourage physicians to
order necessary tests and procedures, it also encourages them to
order unnecessary tests and procedures.22 The system may also
deter the reporting of negligent actions that might otherwise be
used as examples to educate other physicians and improve the
quality of medical care. The net effects of the tort system on the
quality of care are uncertain.
A Better Way?
Given the shortcomings of the medical malpractice system de-
tailed above, it is natural to wonder whether there might be
alternative approaches to achieving the important goals of com-
pensation for injury and reduction of poor quality medical care.
Although many possibilities exist, from first-party insurance to
state-funded compensation funds, physicians at the University
of Michigan are fortunate to practice in an institution that has
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devoted a great deal of attention to creating a less adversarial
approach that attempts to compensate patients harmed by un-
reasonable care while also improving care. Indeed, had the hy-
pothetical case above occurred at our institution, the story
might have unfolded differently.
The University of Michigan has a program, predicated on
honesty, that provides both a mechanism for acknowledging
medical mistakes and a means to compensate injured patients.23
This system is distinct from reforms to the tort law system such
as caps on rewards for noneconomic damages,24 elimination of
the collateral source rule, and limitations on contingency fees to
attorneys. Rather than changing tort law, this program offers an
alternative. In doing so, it attempts to change the institutional
culture to promote honest assessment, open communication,
and apologies for unreasonable care. Of note, many organiza-
tions have advocated disclosure of mistakes to patients, and
disclosure is even one of the patient safety standards required by
the Joint Committee on Accreditation of Health Care Organi-
zations.6 Although the principle of disclosing medical errors to
patients is not new,25,26 acknowledging mistakes and offering
apologies and remedies for unreasonable care is a relatively re-
cent development.
The University of Michigan program was designed as a part
of an integrated quality improvement initiative, one compo-
nent of which is a mechanism for compensating patients
harmed by unreasonable care. The program has also had the
incidental effect of reducing the University’s liability expenses;
the program avoids the costs of litigation because when the
University makes payments within the structure of the program
(which are presumably lower than those that would have been
awarded at trial), those payments are typically predicated on
obtaining a full release of potential legal claims.27 Nonetheless,
cost saving is not the program’s ultimate goal. The program’s
leaders hope that by creating an environment in which physi-
cians are not penalized for acknowledging their mistakes and are
encouraged to do so, they may be more willing to openly discuss
medical errors and develop strategies to prevent similar mistakes
in the future. The program attempts both to reassure providers
that disclosure will not lead to legal or organizational penalties
and to destigmatize admissions of error.28 Ultimately, the
whole program is predicated on the notion that honesty is the
first prerequisite to patient safety improvement.
According to the current program administrators, “Fears
that impede individual physicians from open disclosure are the
fear of losing malpractice coverage, the fear of compromising a
future malpractice case, and the fear of financial ruin. Some of
these fears can be assuaged with a little knowledge, courage, a
change in culture, and planning.”23(p148) As noted by the lead-
ers of the Michigan program, a barrier to disclosure and apology
has been the concern by health providers that their statements
will be used as admissions of fault in a legal proceeding. Indeed,
lawyers and insurers have advised doctors to avoid apologies,
and various commentators have advocated careful disclosure of
medical errors without explicit acknowledgment of wrongdo-
ing to avoid incriminating statements.29,30 A tension exists be-
tween the moral duty to disclose a mistake to a patient and the
desire to protect oneself from the legal repercussions of that
admission. These concerns have persisted despite longstanding
and widespread adoption of shield laws that forbid the admis-
sion of statements of apology or grief by medical practitioners as
evidence of negligence. Some statutes go farther and protect
against the admission of apologies that include statements of
fault, mistakes, error, or liability.31 Massachusetts passed the
first protective law in 1986,32 and by 2010, 34 more states and
the District of Columbia had adopted apology laws (typically
precluding evidence of a physician’s expression of sympathy
from being introduced in a malpractice claim) and nine had
adopted disclosure laws (typically requiring or encouraging pro-
viders to inform patients of unintended outcomes).33 Of note,
until 2011, Michigan had neither type of statute, but Michigan
recently enacted legislation that prohibits statements of sympa-
thy from being admitted as evidence in medical malpractice
claims.
As a quality improvement initiative, the University of Mich-
igan’s program discloses substandard care to injured patients
and compensates patients harmed by unreasonable medical
care23 even if they could not have brought a successful malprac-
tice suit. In fact, in three instances, the University informed
patients that a medical error had occurred and compensated
them even though the statute of limitations for bringing a suit
had expired.34 Moreover, because the hospital policy encour-
ages open dialogue without repercussions, physicians and staff
may be more likely to admit to their errors, partly because the
existence of such a program helps to destigmatize the commis-
sion of errors, and partly because it indicates that the hospital
will support them in the event of a mistake. Early understand-
ing of the source of errors has allowed the institution to imple-
ment system-wide changes to improve patient safety, without
waiting for the final results of litigation. To be sure, many
factors that contribute to providers’ reluctance to expose error
such as embarrassment or the remaining risk of suit persist, but
the shift in culture promoted by the program helps providers
recognize that an admission of error is an integral contribution
to long-term quality improvement. Other programs that have
been successful in similar efforts have also tended to emphasize
the critical connection between error reporting and quality im-
provement.35 Indeed, the Agency for Healthcare Research and
Quality has initiated the Medical Liability Reform and Patient
Safety Initiative, the goals of which include to “foster better
communication between doctors and their patients”36 and
which has funded papers studying disclosure of errors.37
By linking disclosures of medical errors with compensation,
the University of Michigan program might thus satisfy two
aims of medical malpractice tort, compensation and error-pre-
vention, without the intervention from the courts. The pro-
gram may also save costs. Since instituting the program, the
hospital has decreased its malpractice insurance cash reserve
from $70 million to $13 million.34 Because patients may sue to
extract an apology from the defendant or to prevent similar
incidents from happening in the future,38,39 one possible expla-
nation for the decrease in cash reserve is that by receiving apol-
ogies and witnessing a demonstrated commitment to quality
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improvement, fewer patients wish to sue the University. Alter-
natively, by addressing mistakes early on, the policy may have
facilitated settlements and reduced overall malpractice costs.25
It is, however, difficult to isolate the impact of this particular
program in the wake of numerous other secular trends.
The striking experience at our institution may not generalize
to all hospitals. Unlike many smaller hospitals, the University of
Michigan self-insures and completely indemnifies its employed
physicians. This arrangement reduces conflicts of interest
among the physicians, hospital, and insurer. The program may
not be as effective where different carriers insure the hospital
and physicians, or when indemnification is absent, introducing
strategic behavior where it may benefit one party if another
admits liability.
Although the program may neither succeed as well at other
institutions as it has at ours nor eliminate all legal claims, it
offers an alternative resolution to difficult situations in which
substandard care has caused injury. Unlike the case we pre-
sented at the outset of this article, the only case of medical error
one of us has personally seen (a case of wrong-site incision) was
addressed by a prompt apology by the offending surgeon, along
with immediate compensation of the patient by the institution.
She chose to pursue adjuvant therapy at our institution and
appears to continue to hold her physicians and our hospital in
high esteem. Although anecdotal, the examples reported above
show how embracing a culture of provider disclosure and learn-
ing from errors through such a program can both compensate
patients and facilitate long-term reductions in medical errors—
goals that the medical malpractice system has not been partic-
ularly effective or efficient in meeting. Oncology providers at
institutions that do not have such programs should consider
contacting their risk management professionals to determine
their institution’s view (and applicable state laws) regarding the
role of provider apology when mistakes occur. They may also
wish to encourage consideration of similar cultural changes at
their own institutions, where possible.
Accepted for publication on May 5, 2011.
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